The UK Foreign Office’s latest six-monthly report (for first-half 2022) to Parliament on Hong Kong…
Hong Kong’s political landscape continued to be remodelled to allow participation from ‘patriots only’. Space for political opposition and dissent reduced almost entirely. John Lee was selected unopposed as the new Chief Executive. Reprisals continued against democratic politicians. The Hong Kong Government attempted to use the NSL to extend political censorship overseas.
And I was wondering if it would appear by 7 this morning – in its same-day touchy response, the government…
…vehemently refutes the slandering remarks and ill-intentioned political attacks on the HKSAR under the successful application of the “one country, two systems” principle in the so-called United Kingdom Six-monthly Report on Hong Kong: January to June 2022 (Report). The HKSAR is an inalienable part of the People’s Republic of China. The HKSAR Government urges again the United Kingdom (UK) to respect the basic norms governing international relations and stop interfering in the affairs of the HKSAR.
In court on sedition charges, former Stand News editor defends the reporting of news…
The outlet was also accused of glorifying the arrested candidates by carrying another commentary on the mass arrest from Nathan Law, a self-exiled former lawmaker.
More details here. It seems media should report the right sort of news.
Some other things…
Activists convince the Smithsonian to end cultural partnership with the Hong Kong trade office in the US.
Michael Pettis in the SCMP on China’s property woes…
Households who borrow aggressively to buy the largest – and most – flats they can afford become rich far more quickly. Property developers who invent new ways to leverage their land purchases grow faster than their more prudent competitors. Even local governments learn to speculate on ever-rising land sale revenues for their funding, and will reorient their spending to fund projects designed to fuel further rising land sale revenues.
Over time, as the more “prudent” banks, businesses, households and local governments fall behind their competitors, the economy shifts its operations and balance sheets in ways that become increasingly speculative and dependent on rising real estate prices. At some point, which China reached around a decade ago, their speculative behaviour itself becomes a main driver of continued rising prices.
China Dailysays it’s too early to come up with an accurate Covid death toll for China – which is no doubt true.
The Diplomatputs Beijing’s Covid U-turn in the context of increasing centralization in China, and foresees Xi Jinping further clamping down on domestic criticism…
What this means is that without further structural reforms, not only will these [local government] problems continue to fester, but China’s “core leadership” may find itself increasingly unable to escape bearing the brunt – or at least a greater share – of criticisms for them. These problems also threaten to be augmented by a more fundamental political issue the COVID-19 crisis has arguably exposed – that the potentially life-long, increasingly autocratic leadership of Xi could well follow the trajectory of others who became unwilling or unable to see the adverse ramifications of ill thought-out policy decisions.
And, from NPR, Chinese authorities are arresting those involved in the Covid ‘A4’ protests. Quietly…
“The police need a theory to explain away the protests and they are trying to find an organizer to blame,” says a friend of one of the vigil participants arrested.
Hong Kong, it says here, is ‘in the fast lane after a happy and thrilling start to 2023’. And ‘rabbits symbolize peace and prosperity’.
In the fast lane: a NatSec court tells 17 pro-democrats that they must wait until summer to be sentenced for ‘conspiracy to subversion’ – trying to win an election. By that time, they will have been in jail for two years.
And the happy and thrilling: a round-up of the second day of testimony from Stand News former editor. Whole story here. A list of the supposedly seditious articles.
Bloomberg opinion piece on China’s anger at Japan and Korea over travel restrictions, when it could have learned from them.
What Beijing seemingly can’t accept is that, particularly when it comes to Covid, it has done nothing to deserve trust. This is the regime that insisted the virus wasn’t transmitting between people, even as it hoarded supplies of swabs and masks; or to this day continues to hinder efforts to learn more about the pandemic’s origins.
…the visa suspension retaliation is a tit-for-tat reply from Beijing. Leaders are not only pinning hopes on moving quickly past the tsunami of infections but are also under pressure to pacify an angry population scrambling to find medicines.
After social media posts showed inflammatory videos of special lanes being coordinated by soldiers in uniform for Chinese travelers flying into South Korea, newly installed Foreign Minister Qin Gang had to react strongly to the unpleasant scenes.
Indeed, the tension boils down to a lack of public data that would help the outside world understand the massive outbreaks in the mainland.
…On one hand, other governments should handle arrivals from China with a scientific approach. On the other hand, China has to be scientific with its data and share the results with others.
If you can handle more analysis of Beijing’s Covid U-turn, Foreign Affairs on how the U-turn will impact governance in China…
Beijing often blames local government officials when things go wrong. Local authorities are often made the scapegoats for natural disasters, manmade accidents, and disease outbreaks. Leaders in Wuhan, for instance, were punished for “not reporting” the initial appearance of the virus in December 2019. This strategy has allowed the regime to evade responsibility for calamities that resulted in high casualties, such as the Wuhan outbreak, and to prevent any resulting erosion of its legitimacy. The COVID-19 crisis, however, may prove to be an exception.
So it seems that, between the virus and lockdown fatigue, the CCP simply gave up. Infections were rising to an extent that were even pushing the limits of what an authoritarian regime with China’s resources could do.
Serious must-read thread on China’s true stance on Russia while it tries to improve relations with the EU/drive wedge between US and EU.
An account of proceedings in the Stand News case (background here). Also in the courts: convictions and sentences for being present near a riot. And wearing black.
A stiff dose of shrill Mainland rhetoric in the government’s statement after lawyers for Jimmy Lai meet a UK official…
The HKSAR Government opposes and condemns these acts of the aforementioned purported “international legal team” and the UK Government which attempted to undermine the rule of law of Hong Kong and interfere with the independent exercise of judicial power in Hong Kong. The HKSAR Government strongly urges the relevant parties to respect the spirit of the rule of law and stop interfering with the internal affairs of the HKSAR
Minxin Pei in Nikkei Asia on how the CCP can’t do a (Great Leap Forward famine) ‘three difficult years’ type of whitewash on Covid deaths.
From the FT – Mainland redefinition/downplaying of Covid cases gives coverage-providers an excuse to land patients with big hospital bills…
At least 14 Chinese cities and provinces have stopped providing free treatment for coronavirus after Beijing abruptly rolled back its zero-Covid strategy last month…
Hospitals in Shanghai and Guangzhou are instead charging Covid patients with severe cases up to Rmb20,000 ($3,000) — about five months of income for an average urban resident — per day for intensive care…
China’s health policy has also made it difficult for claimants to establish proof of infection. Health officials have narrowed the definition of Covid deaths and cases.
That CSIS war-gaming exercise is here. Long story short: a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be a bloody mess – severely damaging Western forces, wrecking Taiwan, and probably causing the downfall of the CCP.
The Chinese ambassador to Canberra says Australia should be wary of Japan, citing the latter’s World War II-era aggression…
China’s ambassador to Australia Xiao Qian said Canberra should be cautious about trusting Japan, given its attacks on Australia during World War II.
“During the Second World War Japan invaded Australia, bombed Darwin, killed Australians and shot Australian (prisoners of war),” he told reporters.
“Be careful about what might happen in the future. When someone threatens you, he might threaten you again.
“China has been your friend.”
Not creepy or anything. Seemingly within seconds, Japan agrees to boost military cooperation with the UK, and with other European countries. Beijing also tries WWII-shaming Germany – over Taiwan (don’t ask).
Just in case the Japanese do declare war on you, behold the Mini-Manual for the Urban Defender by John Spencer – a guide to defending your city from an invading army. Great ambush tips.
Trying to keep up with the rather rapid spread of Covid in the Mainland – the virus has reportedly infected 90% of Henan.
China Media Projectlooks at a People’s Daily editorial that’s ‘one of the more egregious efforts’ to whitewash Beijing’s handling of Covid…
On the question of responsibility, the “Zhong Sheng” commentary turns legitimate concerns on their head.
Baldly insisting that the sudden policy reversal is scientific and perfect (and foreign reports to the contrary smears) seems counterproductive when everyone can see hospitals overflowing and elderly scientists dying. In terms of basic image, the authorities would surely enjoy more credibility if they openly admitted that things could have been done better, promised an enquiry, and fired a few top health officials. But what do I know about Marxist-Leninist public-relations theory with Chinese characteristics?
Science on the lack of Chinese epidemiological, genomic and other data.
The (probably paywalled) WSJdescribes the broader uncertainty, foreign investors’ bemusement, and Chinese officials’ anger towards foreign media coverage of the confusion…
The whiplash from China’s about-face on its zero-Covid strategy exemplifies the uncertainties that businesses, foreign governments and academics face in dealing with a black-box political system that has become increasingly impenetrable as Mr. Xi has accumulated more power.
…“In some ways, Omicron is easier to predict than the Chinese government,” [European Chamber head] Mr. Wuttke said.
The Diplomattries to find logic behind Beijing’s Covid U-turn…
…moderating a mobilization campaign is extremely difficult. The central government must simultaneously signify a change of the top leader’s specific preference without jeopardizing the overall correctness of mobilization itself. Therefore, local officials tend to play it safe and follow the dependent path when faced with conflicting or confusing signals.
(Includes some interesting historical precedents.)
“March would have been a better time,” [a health official] said. “We would have had more time to shore up the vaccination rate, especially among senior citizens.”
Today’s must read: Atlantic on Beijing’s obsessive pursuit of Jimmy Lai, which involves crafting an extensive narrative to describe and explain the 2019 uprising as someone else’s fault…
The prosecutors paint him as the “mastermind” of a fundraising-and-lobbying effort that, in reality, was largely a crowdsourced undertaking by activists that began on a popular message board.
The court documents also almost exclusively blame Lai for pushing the U.S. government to pass legislation aimed at punishing Hong Kong for its loss of autonomy from the mainland, and later to sanction government officials both in the city and in Beijing. The Hong Kong authorities described Lai in court documents as representing “the highest level of the syndicate” – as though he were a triad boss.
Plus, of course, personal score-settling. The word is that Lai has told his former colleagues to – in effect – save themselves and give evidence against him; the CCP want him to die in prison, so how much more can they punish him? In theory, this might bolster the authorities’ line. In practice, it will probably confirm to many what Lai has long said about the CCP.
From the weekend…
Chinese U student paper Varsity examines why productive industrial operations have to make way for public housing…
‘…the government tends to avoid underutilised plots controlled by village gentries and land banks of property developers when it tries to resume lands for urban development.’
The Committee for the Protection of Journalists calls for the release of two reporters imprisoned after covering the 2019 protests.
From HKFP: an op-ed on Beijing’s ‘interpretation’, an update on the Stand News sedition trial, and a look at Hong Kong’s embarrassing Covid U-turns.
Had Xi planned all along to wait until after the Congress to ditch zero COVID? If so, one would have expected a more orderly process, with Xi in command and claiming victory, as he has done all along. What we see looks more like hasty policy decisions – possibly not made by the central government – coming in response to resistance. Meanwhile, Xi has remained on the sidelines, and it is not clear there is any overall program. This suggests that Xi is either laying low to avoid responsibility until the worst passes or is unable to make policy and has left his nation rudderless in a storm.
ProPublicainterview with journalist Sam Cooper on ties between United Front and criminal groups in Canada.
Completely out-of-area and off-subject, for quiz fans: a grainy 1999 University Challenge special between two teams of journalists, one captained by then-columnist Boris Johnson.
Reluctantly coming to terms with the fact that 2023 has begun.
Hong Kong is Asia’s Covid death-rate hub-zone. But first the good news:
Hong Kong, [unlike the Mainland], is still reporting covid deaths. Though Beijing has brought the city under its direct authoritarian control, Hong Kong’s official covid statistics are still widely regarded as transparent and accurate.
The bad news is that Hong Kong has six times the US – and double Botswana’s – Covid deaths per million.
In anticipation of upcoming high-profile court cases, Justice Minister Paul Lam seems to imply that overseas criticism of Hong Kong’s legal system constitutes a national security threat…
Lam warned of national security risks in the form of “escalating attacks” from the Western media and politicians.
“They have made repeated attempts to slander Hong Kong’s laws and judicial system and have even maliciously attacked court rulings,” he said, adding that the administration must strengthen its defense to “welcome” and prepare for such attacks.
“We must not think these malicious acts will peter out,” he said. “Instead, we must prepare for possible intensified attacks, especially when there will be a number of key national security cases this year.
“We must strengthen our defenses and retaliate, both internally and externally.”
Reading deeper between the lines, we have to wonder whether a bigger problem is a lack of genuine risks and dangers for the extensive NatSec bureaucracy to detect and fight. The main form of ‘retaliation’ here will be to mount more official overseas visits to tell ‘true and good’ stories about rule of law in Hong Kong. (Possible example: if you’re a cop accused of molestation and assault, you get bail; if you’re a speech therapist who produced sheep cartoons, you don’t. More cartoon panic here.)
You’d have thought the government would – out of enlightened self-interest – at least try to make accessing the tax department safe. But even at the new Inland Revenue Dept HQ, the Anti-Pedestrian Dept is at work: if you get run over crossing the road, it’s your fault for not driving there by car.
Weekend reading…
From a couple of months ago, for fellow followers of ‘neo-Stalinist decivilization of elite politics’, something from the Royal United Services Institute.
And after archaeology, nationalism gets into Mainland sexology.
Pandemic prevention policy is scientific, proactive, and under control, and is being carried out in a planned and measured manner. This runs counter to false charges, leveled by the United States and the West, that China was “forced to relax its grip” or is “unprepared.”
Well, that’s me convinced!
In an interview with Anne Stevenson-Yang – China’s Covid-strategy-as-centralization-push, the ‘investability’ of China, and more…
…I have to say I think there has been some kind of quiet internal revolt against Xi Jinping’s personal rule.
…It’s important to be aware that China is really two countries: You have a fairly prosperous nation along the coast, and then you have a billion people in the interior who are there essentially just to supply cheap labor to the coastal cities. Since the coastal cities have not paid the full cost of that labor in terms of education, healthcare and pensions, their economies have looked very buoyant. In contrast to that, the health and education of the people in the interior is at a level similar to Algeria’s. Social well-being is definitely worse than, say, Malaysia. So if you were to raise those people out of poverty and sort of blend them with the 350 million on the coast, you would drag down growth for everybody. And if you were to leave them out entirely, you basically split the country.
In the Standard – comment and update on Hong Kong’s hamster situation.
From TransitJam, how you get a toppled-over bus out of the bushes around Lohas Park.
Just kidding – they mean you’re on your own against Covid.
Beijing’s ‘interpretation’ gives Hong Kong’s government the power to bar foreign lawyers from NatSec trials, specifically that of Jimmy Lai. NPC Observer’s analysis of the ‘interpretation’ goes over the details, concluding…
Beyond the confines of Lai’s case and the specific issue it raised, the [NatSec] Committee’s seemingly broad and unreviewable power to “make [enforceable] judgments and decisions” on whether an issue of national security is involved, regardless of setting, could be cause for concern. It awaits to be seen whether and to what extent it would invoke this newly declared authority to deal with other situations in the future.
An optimistic/guileless SCMP op-ed hopes the powers will be used ‘with sensitivity and restraint’…
There is clearly an intention that the new mechanism, involving the chief executive and security committee, will be deployed to resolve other disputes over the national security law. This, presumably, means Hong Kong will not have to run to Beijing for an interpretation every time it can’t get its way in court.
Samuel Bickett puts it more plainly in this thread…
Beijing’s own body in the city, the Committee for Safeguarding National Security, can declare any matter – in court or in society – to “involve national security” and thus be subject to the Committee’s final and unchallengeable regulation and restriction.
Yesterday’s interpretation expands the already broad power of the Chief Executive to control court proceedings in national security cases. Under Article 44 of the NSL, the Chief Executive appoints national security judges. Under Article 18, the Chief Executive appoints the head of the DOJ’s national security prosecutions office. Under Article 46, the Chief Executive-appointed Secretary for Justice can bar a jury from hearing a case. And now, under the Article 47 interpretation, the Chief Executive can declare a defendant’s choice of counsel barred from participation in the case. Thus, the Chief Executive comprehensively holds power over both parties’ counsel, the judge, and the jury – an impossible prospect for national security defendants, and a death knell for judicial independence and due process…
Beijing’s interpretation did not stop there, however. Never one to miss an opportunity for a power grab, Beijing decided to use the occasion of the interpretation to vastly expand its own power in Hong Kong by creating a mechanism for its representatives in the city to overrule virtually any court, governmental, or political decision.
…as a result of Beijing’s interpretation this week, the [NatSec] Committee can declare any case, brought under any charges, to implicate national security, forcing the court to then strip away these rights from the defendant and transfer the case to a national security judge.
For ‘Chief Executive’ in the first sentence, read ‘Beijing’.
…the NSL interpretation today creates a de facto Political-Legal Committee for Hong Kong: judicial independence vanishes when the executive authorities can override court decision without being challenged by judicial review.
…both the Hong Kong CE and the NatSec [Committee] can now intervene and override the HK court at any time, and their decisions and acts would not be subject to any judicial review or any other form of legal challenge or oversight.
…But it gets worse. Given that Hong Kong NatSec [Committee] has plenary, unchecked powers to decide what is or isn’t NatSec, and make decisions in relation to the same, such powers can go beyond NatSec litigation or any litigation. It can touch on any policy area.
In a Leninist system, courts cannot overrule the government. No-one can.
Some worthwhile links for the next few days’ hibernation…
This week’s must-read: Reuters on the neutering of Hong Kong’s legal profession and the departures of such figures as Michael Vidler, Paul Harris and (as it happens) Eric Lai, Kevin Yam and Dennis Kwok…
The intimidation is having a broad chilling effect, as less prominent lawyers also flee the city…
One Hong Kong solicitor who has relocated to England told Reuters that she knew of at least 80 Hong Kong lawyers who had moved to Britain since the security law was imposed in June 2020. Another lawyer, now living in Australia, estimated that several dozen Hong Kong lawyers had moved there.
An official hurt-feelings department pre-emptively gets a statement into the article…
“There is no truth in the alleged harassment or intimidation of ‘human rights’ lawyers” by the government, the Hong Kong Chief Executive’s Office said in response to questions from Reuters. “We dispute and strongly object to your highly suggestive questions and biased, baseless and false accusations against the Hong Kong National Security Law (NSL) and law enforcement actions taken by law enforcement agencies.”
HK Democracy Council adds up the political prisoners in Hong Kong for 2022. (Hong Kong residents may need to use a proxy server). Summary in thread.
FT piece doubts the peg could survive a US-China clash over Taiwan
The system has just one weakness, but it is existential. To function as a financial centre, Hong Kong must have access to US dollar clearing. If the city’s banks ever lost access to the American financial system, then a dollar in Hong Kong would not be worth the same as a dollar in New York. Under such circumstances, the peg could not hold for long — and the US imposed exactly these sanctions on Russia after it invaded Ukraine this year.
Critique of a Foreign Affairs piece suggesting that the US can postpone conflict over Taiwan…
[CCP] leadership was not can-kicking when it set in motion its scheme to swallow the Taiwanese economy whole. We might have been deferring the Taiwan issue to an unknown future; they were deferring nothing. They were using economic, cultural, and political means to produce a settlement in their favor. There was a moment in the [Taiwan President Ma Ying Jeou 2008-16] administration where this looked like a winning strategy. That moment is passed; it will not return. The trajectory of Taiwanese politics from the Sunflower movement to the present day has delivered engagers in Beijing one resounding defeat after another. What is more: the Chinese know it.
From Hollywood Reporter – why China’s Born to Fly movie (supposedly a Top Gun) was mysteriously grounded…
…word within the Beijing film industry is that Born to Fly‘s producers were made to realize that their movie’s stunts and visual effects were far inferior to Top Gun: Maverick’s and that the Chinese version risked ridicule in comparison…
As 2022 has unfolded and the true nature of the Russia-China relationship has become more apparent, the danger it poses seems less acute. What has emerged is nothing like an axis of autocrats, but a lopsided partnership in which the terms are defined by its alpha member, Xi Jinping, primarily to serve China’s interests. This tells us a lot about the foreign-policy principles of China’s leaders and how those ideas may hamper Beijing’s quest to reshape the world order.
From the Command and Coordination Group press conference, CE John Lee’s comments explaining how – after months of unconvincingly explained foot-dragging – the sudden Covid U-turn is part of a highly planned strategy. Quick thread detailing the inconsistencies…
The overall perception rather is that HK authorities have been constrained in their decision by what authorities up north (Guangdong and Beijing) might have wanted – and sadly that’s a reality Lee can’t even share with his constituents, even in diplomatic words.
A late entry in the Really Bad Arguments of the Month Competition: Deputy Magistrate Kennis Tai, who ruled that the law banning people from urging others to not to vote in elections is constitutional…
The magistrate ruled that inciting people to cast invalid ballots “was not facilitating democracy,” as the move was “expecting to influence the public with collective power on whether they cast their ballots, or what their votes would be.”
Tai said that people who were incited to cast blank votes would waste electoral resources, and ruled that the restrictions imposed by the law were “reasonable and necessary” as it did not target a particular political group.
She added that people could still cast … invalid votes, they could just not encourage others to do so, and said the legislation preserved “a space for private discussion.”
Surely the government’s pro-voting campaigns are ‘expecting to influence’ etc. And the boycott idea was largely spurred by the ban on ‘a particular political group’ (pro-democrats) from the ballot. And how can ‘encouraging others’ to do something lawful be illegal?
Rubber-stamp LegCo rattles through government funding requests in minutes…
The chairman of Legco’s Finance Committee, Chan Chun-ying, on Thursday said he believes more funding applications can be scrutinized every year now that all lawmakers are patriots…
The new Chinese emperor, Xi Jinping, has been shown to have no clothes. However long he stays in power, his myth has been broken, both inside China and around the world. More practically, all sorts of assumptions about the future of China and therefore of the world have been called into question.
More politically driven archaeology and historiography. Remember plucky little sunny Zhangzhung? The ancient pre-Buddhist Himalayan kingdom? Beijing does…
Beijing is doing a large amount of research and excavation in western Tibet relating to Zhangzhung, but there is little examination of the topic outside China.
…China wants to link Tibetan culture and religion to Zhangzhung, thereby peeling it away from its Indian roots.
Zhangzhung must be China’s because Tibet is, and Tibet must be China’s because Zhangzhung is.
On out-of-area matters, esteemed speechwriter James Fallows on the drafting of Volodymyr Zelensky’s address to Congress.
Rather obviously emulating Beijing, Hong Kong relaxes most Covid restrictions – except the really pointless and annoying ones. In particular, mask-wearing outdoors. (Don’t the authorities realize that compulsory mask-wearing has become so ingrained in Hong Kong life that many couples now get married without ever having seen each other’s faces, and still haven’t even weeks after their wedding day?)
Thus the prospect of border-opening. Naturally, we are all salivating over the prospect of millions of Mainland visitors pouring in again. Hundreds of small local grocery, stationery, hardware and hairdressing businesses to be shut down and replaced by rows of identical stores selling paracetamol and milk powder to ‘tourists’.
Meanwhile, the government unveils HK Talent Engage to attract a different sort of entrepreneur. In an attempt to be hip and groovy, it has a section called ‘practicalities’ featuring ‘Got love for a fluffy friend?’…
…pet lovers tend to steer away from busy urban districts and instead opt for village houses, where there’s more space and your fur babies can live closer to nature.
Please explain this to my neighbourhood owners of four-legged poop-factories.
