Big Lychee, Various Sectors

The Hong Kong government sets up a ‘good stories’ task force to…

…[devise] narratives for the new situation, new potentials and new opportunities in Hong Kong under its new development stage. …the Task Force aims to allow friends and stakeholders in Hong Kong, the Mainland and overseas regions to have a more comprehensive understanding of Hong Kong’s advantages and opportunities so that the city’s edges can be fully known, understood and recognised.

Interestingly, the new new new normalcy is all of the post-Covid variety rather than anything icky following the 2019 ‘social events’, ‘terrorist attacks’ or whatever it’s called now – but telling stories well is hard with the NatSec complex’s arrests and show-trials apparently becoming a permanent ongoing facet of Hong Kong’s image.

Along with an array of Bureau heads, the task force includes the usual property developers, other business types, government-friendly academics, token ethnics (with two Germans) – and media figures Li Ruigang of CMC and the SCMP’s Tammy Tam. Also, ‘partner organizations’. It sounds like a pretty unwieldy line-up, but this exercise is probably more about telling task force members what line to push at conferences rather than gathering their advice on how to spin contemporary Hong Kong. 

Prepare to be amazed. Or something.

On the subject of NatSec – HKFP’s monthly update on the crackdown. And eight more people were imprisoned for 11-45 months for being at a protest…

Now, in all, 892 #HongKongers have been sentenced to a total of 1,432 years in prison for political crimes. Hundreds of others have been sentenced to non-fixed terms in juvenile detention or remanded in custody pending completion of trial, for a total of 1,325 #PoliticalPrisoners

Fancy your skills at serious heavy-duty spin? Try helping Wang Huning craft Beijing’s replacement for ‘one country two systems’ as a Taiwan policy.

Some HK Free Press pieces you might have missed… 

Revealing which media are and are not invited to John Lee’s inauguration would aid terrorists. (Maybe the more outlets are allowed to cover the show, the more the public is terrorized with boredom.)

Spring festival sedition trials: Stand News for publishing opinions, and a Portuguese citizen for Internet posts and crowdfunding for ‘military expenses’. A comment on the former…

The longer this trial goes on, the more clear it becomes that GovHK thinks that any media outlet that allows any protester or pro-Demo person to express their view is guilty of sedition.

(Also, a thread on the disappearance of online media archives.)

And Beijing and Hong Kong officials lash out against remarks by the US Consul-General. Government release – 1,800 words of overly wrought righteous fury – here…

…the US Government and politicians have been repeatedly exploiting different incidents and occasions, as well as creating excuses, to slander the NSL and attack the HKSAR in its dutiful, faithful and lawful implementation of the NSL. 

Perhaps the authorities could arrange to have fewer ‘incidents and occasions’ in the first place?

Elsewhere…

YouTube interview with Pete Spurrier of Blacksmith Books. Who knew the trendy and glamorous world of publishing includes scooping coins up in the middle of a flooded road?

The CCP spells out its ‘national security’ neurosis: from the Center for Strategic Translation, an English version of an extract from The Total National Security Paradigm: A Study Outline…

“an important and authoritative auxiliary text for the broad mass of cadres” to include in their group study sessions.

George Magnus in New Statesman on China’s economic prospects…

If the ultimate goal of the government is to have a compliant citizenry that is beholden to and trusting in the CCP, the last few months have done the opposite. The zero Covid experience has stained the government’s reputation and its status among citizens. Xi’s political status is secure, but his reputation is now clearly flawed.

NY Mag interview with Michael Pettis on the same subject.

The Guardian on Xi’s hold on power, regardless of screw-ups…

Several analysts the Guardian spoke to described a catch-22 in Xi’s leadership, but one he ultimately benefits from. He has consolidated power so successfully that he essentially is the party. It means that he owns its mistakes as well as its successes, but having effectively destroyed the prospects of any opposition, it’s of little consequence. There may be dissatisfaction with Xi, but not among anyone powerful enough to do something about it.

(Also in the Guardian – a pretty good long read on the Cultural Revolution, including Xi Jinping’s ‘creation myth’.)

The Belt and Road vision-concept thing will be 10 years old this year. 9 Dash Line takes stock…

…BRI has all but disappeared from official statements and speeches by the Chinese leadership … Nonetheless, the Chinese leadership is reluctant to fully abandon the BRI, aiming to reframe and transform the initiative instead. 

China Digital Times looks at the struggle to portray it as a success. And WSJ (firewalled) on badly built projects starting to crumble from Uganda to Ecuador to Pakistan. 

From China Media Project – how Chinese authorities are Trying Too Hard to enlist exchange students in ‘discourse power’ propaganda initiatives.

Also from CDT, Cyberspace Administration guidelines on countering ‘gloomy sentiments’ during Spring Festival…

4. Strengthen the crackdown on feudal superstitions and unhealthy traditions. First, continue to clean up posts and videos that praise or promote feudal superstitions and practices, fortune telling, divination, and other illegal services. Strictly limit the use of click-bait posts that feature revealing clothing or suggestive behaviors to create vulgar personas such as “hotel hottie,” “scenic-spot hottie,” “snow hottie,” “rural hottie,” “food delivery hottie,” etc.

The Hong Kong CE says he aims to pass a local (‘Article 23’) NatSec Law this year. Despite the overrides-everything 2020 NatSec Law, there are loopholes everywhere you look – in NatSec-related laws, in tech and in new media. Foreign agents, espionage and plots also abound. 

Lee says the NatSec bill…

would focus on preventing “clandestine espionage activities,” block new methods of spying that arise from technological advancements, and plug loopholes introduced by new media. He did not specify how the law would legislate these areas.

In addition, the chief executive said there had been many “foreign agents” acting under the guise of different names, institutions or forums in Hong Kong.

Executive Councilor Ronny Tong weighs in…

“The work of restricting foreign political organizations to campaign in Hong Kong has never been done, nor that of restricting local groups from building ties with foreign political groups,” Tong said. 

“In other countries, crimes like treason and sedition always lead to life imprisonment or even the death penalty. Whereas under the NSL, the maximum penalty is only life imprisonment.”

(OK, Ronny – what about other countries’ penalties for sheep cartoons?)

Lee’s parallel comments on the media (HKFP story) suggest that, one way or another, the authorities will find ways to counter ‘fake news’, tighten control/monitoring of the Internet and social media, and turn up the paranoia on foreign-linked journalists – not to mention academics, NGOs, crowdfunding causes and other groups.

The large and amply funded NatSec police department will no doubt find plenty to do. (Yesterday they arrested six people for selling books.)

Maybe experts in the Leninist theory of dialectical contradiction can sort this out: one part of the Hong Kong government is trying hard to promote the city as distinct, free and international, while another part rants about how it is part of and subject to China and sees evil foreign forces’ threats everywhere.

Up north, China has officially announced that its population is declining ‘earlier than expected’, though probably several years after it started. Yi Fuzian, demonized (by Beijing) demographer, raises the alarm. (His article from last year.) While another expert says excitable commentators can calm down – the phenomenon is too slow-moving and forecastable to be a ‘crisis’.

Yi is not entirely exaggerating Beijing’s challenges. 

In particular, China has reached the declining-population stage while its per-capita GDP is still at around the level of, say, Mexico. Other countries in this position – South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Spain, Italy, Germany, etc – have developed economies and can largely afford extra pension, healthcare and other costs (and can attract immigrants). 

Also, China’s residential property sector combines absurd overvaluations with massive oversupply and an unavoidable decline in demand – good luck ‘growing into it’. Yet a collapse in prices really could spark big trouble.

Increased productivity is the only way to go. That means institutional reforms – like getting the state out of the allocation of capital. Can the CCP stomach that?

And no-one wants babies.

Barring anything really interesting happening, that’s probably it around here til the Year of the Water Rabbit. Gung Hei…

The Standard feigns fascination – a la front page – about whether former CE Carrie Lam is being appointed to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, and if not, why not. As with the NPC, the CPPCC’s function is ceremonial, and membership is the Mainland equivalent of a Gold Bauhinia Medal for flunkies. The editorial suggests that she will not receive the symbolic award because Beijing doesn’t totally trust former colonial-era civil servants. Beijing doesn’t trust anybody. Anyone who remembers 2019 can think of more obvious reasons. 

A billionaire property tycoon makes a bigger display of empathy for the less-advantaged than the legislature, let alone the government. Corporate PR folk like to describe such little gestures as ‘meaningful’. In this case, the public may infer a meaning in the contrast with Hong Kong officialdom’s longstanding contempt for the poor.

Bemused about the commercial spaceport (ie rocket-launch site) agreement signed between Djibouti and one Hong Kong Aerospace Technology? This thread (link corrected) does some digging. The company was created via a backdoor listing in 2021 (yield: 0.00%). Executives include United Front figures, and INEDs include Rimsky Yuen, Ceajer Chan and Nicholas Brooke. And it is linked to a Shenzhen entity with – well, duh – ties to the Mainland’s state aerospace corporation.

Watch Djibouti reach Mars first.

Something tells me the Jimmy Lai NatSec trial isn’t going to help tell good Hong Kong stories…

Caoilfhionne Gallagher KC, a barrister at London’s Doughty Street Chambers, who is part of Lai’s international legal team, revealed that she and others have received threats as part of what she said was the ‘extraterritorial targeting’ of those speaking out against his treatment. 

…Gallagher said that she has received three rape threats, one death threat and ‘multiple spurious impersonating emails’ purporting to come from her.  

…she said that regardless of who represents Lai, he will have a ‘show trial’ with a predetermined outcome, based on trumped up charges designed to silence Lai. 

‘We do not believe he will get a fair trial. He’s being prosecuted under a fundamentally unfair law, which is a violation of international principles,’ she said.  

More here.

Think of a number. Any number. But not too high. Now knock a zero off. Tweak a bit downwards to create impression of scientific accuracy. Bingo!

The UK Foreign Office’s latest six-monthly report (for first-half 2022) to Parliament on Hong Kong… 

Hong Kong’s political landscape continued to be remodelled to allow participation from ‘patriots only’. Space for political opposition and dissent reduced almost entirely. John Lee was selected unopposed as the new Chief Executive. Reprisals continued against democratic politicians. The Hong Kong Government attempted to use the NSL to extend political censorship overseas.

And I was wondering if it would appear by 7 this morning – in its same-day touchy response, the government…

…vehemently refutes the slandering remarks and ill-intentioned political attacks on the HKSAR under the successful application of the “one country, two systems” principle in the so-called United Kingdom Six-monthly Report on Hong Kong: January to June 2022 (Report). The HKSAR is an inalienable part of the People’s Republic of China. The HKSAR Government urges again the United Kingdom (UK) to respect the basic norms governing international relations and stop interfering in the affairs of the HKSAR.

In court on sedition charges, former Stand News editor defends the reporting of news…

The outlet was also accused of glorifying the arrested candidates by carrying another commentary on the mass arrest from Nathan Law, a self-exiled former lawmaker.

More details here. It seems media should report the right sort of news.

Some other things…

Activists convince the Smithsonian to end cultural partnership with the Hong Kong trade office in the US.

Michael Pettis in the SCMP on China’s property woes…

Households who borrow aggressively to buy the largest – and most – flats they can afford become rich far more quickly. Property developers who invent new ways to leverage their land purchases grow faster than their more prudent competitors. Even local governments learn to speculate on ever-rising land sale revenues for their funding, and will reorient their spending to fund projects designed to fuel further rising land sale revenues.

Over time, as the more “prudent” banks, businesses, households and local governments fall behind their competitors, the economy shifts its operations and balance sheets in ways that become increasingly speculative and dependent on rising real estate prices. At some point, which China reached around a decade ago, their speculative behaviour itself becomes a main driver of continued rising prices.

China Daily says it’s too early to come up with an accurate Covid death toll for China – which is no doubt true.

The Diplomat puts Beijing’s Covid U-turn in the context of increasing centralization in China, and foresees Xi Jinping further clamping down on domestic criticism…

What this means is that without further structural reforms, not only will these [local government] problems continue to fester, but China’s “core leadership” may find itself increasingly unable to escape bearing the brunt – or at least a greater share – of criticisms for them. These problems also threaten to be augmented by a more fundamental political issue the COVID-19 crisis has arguably exposed – that the potentially life-long, increasingly autocratic leadership of Xi could well follow the trajectory of others who became unwilling or unable to see the adverse ramifications of ill thought-out policy decisions. 

And, from NPR, Chinese authorities are arresting those involved in the Covid ‘A4’ protests. Quietly…

“The police need a theory to explain away the protests and they are trying to find an organizer to blame,” says a friend of one of the vigil participants arrested.

Hong Kong, it says here, is ‘in the fast lane after a happy and thrilling start to 2023’. And ‘rabbits symbolize peace and prosperity’.

In the fast lane: a NatSec court tells 17 pro-democrats that they must wait until summer to be sentenced for ‘conspiracy to subversion’ – trying to win an election. By that time, they will have been in jail for two years.

And the happy and thrilling: a round-up of the second day of testimony from Stand News former editor. Whole story here. A list of the supposedly seditious articles.

Bloomberg opinion piece on China’s anger at Japan and Korea over travel restrictions, when it could have learned from them.

What Beijing seemingly can’t accept is that, particularly when it comes to Covid, it has done nothing to deserve trust. This is the regime that insisted the virus wasn’t transmitting between people, even as it hoarded supplies of swabs and masks; or to this day continues to hinder efforts to learn more about the pandemic’s origins. 

Standard editorial…

…the visa suspension retaliation is a tit-for-tat reply from Beijing. Leaders are not only pinning hopes on moving quickly past the tsunami of infections but are also under pressure to pacify an angry population scrambling to find medicines.

After social media posts showed inflammatory videos of special lanes being coordinated by soldiers in uniform for Chinese travelers flying into South Korea, newly installed Foreign Minister Qin Gang had to react strongly to the unpleasant scenes.

Indeed, the tension boils down to a lack of public data that would help the outside world understand the massive outbreaks in the mainland.

…On one hand, other governments should handle arrivals from China with a scientific approach. On the other hand, China has to be scientific with its data and share the results with others.

If you can handle more analysis of Beijing’s Covid U-turn, Foreign Affairs on how the U-turn will impact governance in China…

Beijing often blames local government officials when things go wrong. Local authorities are often made the scapegoats for natural disasters, manmade accidents, and disease outbreaks. Leaders in Wuhan, for instance, were punished for “not reporting” the initial appearance of the virus in December 2019. This strategy has allowed the regime to evade responsibility for calamities that resulted in high casualties, such as the Wuhan outbreak, and to prevent any resulting erosion of its legitimacy. The COVID-19 crisis, however, may prove to be an exception.

And here’s the Spectator’s…

So it seems that, between the virus and lockdown fatigue, the CCP simply gave up. Infections were rising to an extent that were even pushing the limits of what an authoritarian regime with China’s resources could do.

Serious must-read thread on China’s true stance on Russia while it tries to improve relations with the EU/drive wedge between US and EU.

An account of proceedings in the Stand News case (background here). Also in the courts: convictions and sentences for being present near a riot. And wearing black.

A stiff dose of shrill Mainland rhetoric in the government’s statement after lawyers for Jimmy Lai meet a UK official…

The HKSAR Government opposes and condemns these acts of the aforementioned purported “international legal team” and the UK Government which attempted to undermine the rule of law of Hong Kong and interfere with the independent exercise of judicial power in Hong Kong. The HKSAR Government strongly urges the relevant parties to respect the spirit of the rule of law and stop interfering with the internal affairs of the HKSAR

Minxin Pei in Nikkei Asia on how the CCP can’t do a (Great Leap Forward famine) ‘three difficult years’ type of whitewash on Covid deaths.

From the FT – Mainland redefinition/downplaying of Covid cases gives coverage-providers an excuse to land patients with big hospital bills…

At least 14 Chinese cities and provinces have stopped providing free treatment for coronavirus after Beijing abruptly rolled back its zero-Covid strategy last month… 

Hospitals in Shanghai and Guangzhou are instead charging Covid patients with severe cases up to Rmb20,000 ($3,000) — about five months of income for an average urban resident — per day for intensive care…

China’s health policy has also made it difficult for claimants to establish proof of infection. Health officials have narrowed the definition of Covid deaths and cases.

That CSIS war-gaming exercise is here. Long story short: a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be a bloody mess – severely damaging Western forces, wrecking Taiwan, and probably causing the downfall of the CCP.

The Chinese ambassador to Canberra says Australia should be wary of Japan, citing the latter’s World War II-era aggression…

China’s ambassador to Australia Xiao Qian said Canberra should be cautious about trusting Japan, given its attacks on Australia during World War II. 

“During the Second World War Japan invaded Australia, bombed Darwin, killed Australians and shot Australian (prisoners of war),” he told reporters. 

“Be careful about what might happen in the future. When someone threatens you, he might threaten you again. 

“China has been your friend.” 

Not creepy or anything. Seemingly within seconds, Japan agrees to boost military cooperation with the UK, and with other European countries. Beijing also tries WWII-shaming Germany – over Taiwan (don’t ask).

Just in case the Japanese do declare war on you, behold the Mini-Manual for the Urban Defender by John Spencer – a guide to defending your city from an invading army. Great ambush tips.

Trying to keep up with the rather rapid spread of Covid in the Mainland – the virus has reportedly infected 90% of Henan.

China Media Project looks at a People’s Daily editorial that’s ‘one of the more egregious efforts’ to whitewash Beijing’s handling of Covid…

On the question of responsibility, the “Zhong Sheng” commentary turns legitimate concerns on their head.

Baldly insisting that the sudden policy reversal is scientific and perfect (and foreign reports to the contrary smears) seems counterproductive when everyone can see hospitals overflowing and elderly scientists dying. In terms of basic image, the authorities would surely enjoy more credibility if they openly admitted that things could have been done better, promised an enquiry, and fired a few top health officials. But what do I know about Marxist-Leninist public-relations theory with Chinese characteristics?

Science on the lack of Chinese epidemiological, genomic and other data. 

The (probably paywalled) WSJ describes the broader uncertainty, foreign investors’ bemusement, and Chinese officials’ anger towards foreign media coverage of the confusion…

The whiplash from China’s about-face on its zero-Covid strategy exemplifies the uncertainties that businesses, foreign governments and academics face in dealing with a black-box political system that has become increasingly impenetrable as Mr. Xi has accumulated more power.

…“In some ways, Omicron is easier to predict than the Chinese government,” [European Chamber head] Mr. Wuttke said. 

The Diplomat tries to find logic behind Beijing’s Covid U-turn…

…moderating a mobilization campaign is extremely difficult. The central government must simultaneously signify a change of the top leader’s specific preference without jeopardizing the overall correctness of mobilization itself. Therefore, local officials tend to play it safe and follow the dependent path when faced with conflicting or confusing signals.

(Includes some interesting historical precedents.)

And the SCMP…

“March would have been a better time,” [a health official] said. “We would have had more time to shore up the vaccination rate, especially among senior citizens.”

Today’s must read: Atlantic on Beijing’s obsessive pursuit of Jimmy Lai, which involves crafting an extensive narrative to describe and explain the 2019 uprising as someone else’s fault…

The prosecutors paint him as the “mastermind” of a fundraising-and-lobbying effort that, in reality, was largely a crowdsourced undertaking by activists that began on a popular message board.

The court documents also almost exclusively blame Lai for pushing the U.S. government to pass legislation aimed at punishing Hong Kong for its loss of autonomy from the mainland, and later to sanction government officials both in the city and in Beijing. The Hong Kong authorities described Lai in court documents as representing “the highest level of the syndicate” – as though he were a triad boss.

Plus, of course, personal score-settling. The word is that Lai has told his former colleagues to – in effect – save themselves and give evidence against him; the CCP want him to die in prison, so how much more can they punish him? In theory, this might bolster the authorities’ line. In practice, it will probably confirm to many what Lai has long said about the CCP.

From the weekend…

Chinese U student paper Varsity examines why productive industrial operations have to make way for public housing…

‘…the government tends to avoid underutilised plots controlled by village gentries and land banks of property developers when it tries to resume lands for urban development.’

The Committee for the Protection of Journalists calls for the release of two reporters imprisoned after covering the 2019 protests.

From HKFP: an op-ed on Beijing’s ‘interpretation’, an update on the Stand News sedition trial, and a look at Hong Kong’s embarrassing Covid U-turns.

The Diplomat on Beijing’s Covid reversal…

Had Xi planned all along to wait until after the Congress to ditch zero COVID? If so, one would have expected a more orderly process, with Xi in command and claiming victory, as he has done all along. What we see looks more like hasty policy decisions – possibly not made by the central government – coming in response to resistance. Meanwhile, Xi has remained on the sidelines, and it is not clear there is any overall program. This suggests that Xi is either laying low to avoid responsibility until the worst passes or is unable to make policy and has left his nation rudderless in a storm.

ProPublica interview with journalist Sam Cooper on ties between United Front and criminal groups in Canada.

Completely out-of-area and off-subject, for quiz fans: a grainy 1999 University Challenge special between two teams of journalists, one captained by then-columnist Boris Johnson.