An explanation from China Digital Times of the ‘garbage time of history’…
When the result of a sporting match becomes a foregone conclusion and lesser players are subbed in to run out the clock, announcers often term it “garbage time.” The latest term to sweep the Chinese internet holds that nations, too, experience a similar phenomenon: the “garbage time of history” (历史的垃圾时间, lìshǐ de lājī shíjiān). Coined by the essayist Hu Wenhui in a 2023 WeChat post, “the garbage time of history” refers to the period when a nation or system is no longer viable—when it has ceased to progress, but has not yet collapsed. Hu defined it as the point at which “the die is cast and defeat is inevitable. Any attempt to struggle against it is futile.” Hu’s sweeping essay led with Soviet stagnation under Brezhnev and then jumped nimbly between the historiography of the collapse of the Ming Dynasty and Lu Xun’s opinions on Tang Dynasty poetry. Unasserted but implied in the essay is that China today finds itself in similar straits.
A partial translation of the essay follows.
At Bloomberg, Minxin Pei picks up on the Chinese people’s pessimism about the country’s prospects during the ‘garbage time’ …
On the surface, such pessimism is driven by economic woes. The collapse of the real estate sector has shrunk the net worth of the middle-class. The resulting negative wealth effect has curbed consumption, exacerbating the slump and threatening deflation.
The malaise, however, has deeper political roots. The country has gone through much worse economic times before without despairing. Tens of thousands of state-owned enterprises were liquidated and more than 30 million workers laid off at the end of the 1990s. Still, ordinary Chinese remained optimistic about the future.
The difference is that those citizens believed in the competence of the reformist then-premier Zhu Rongji…
…Now, Chinese are not only dissatisfied with government decisions. More importantly, they see no possibility of improvement because the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party has repeatedly signaled that it intends to maintain the same domestic and foreign policies that have led to economic stagnation at home and geopolitical tensions abroad.
…Under Xi, the party is ruled by a highly centralized, if not personalized, leadership. Changing or reversing policies is extremely hard, if not impossible, as evidenced by the absence of major shifts since China’s recent economic struggles began in mid-2023.
Which leads us to a post by former Mainland real-estate developer Desmond Shum on ‘the Key Characteristics of Xi Jinping’…
When Xi took power in 2013, he saw a China growing more diverse, which he perceived as a threat to the CCP’s dominance. To counter this, he dismantled his political rivals, reorganized the bureaucracy, and reasserted state control over key sectors—media, real estate, finance, and more.
Xi views this as trading short-term pain for long-term gain, but his failure to grasp the depth of the immediate consequences has drastically altered China’s trajectory. The country now finds itself on a path of decline, a result of Xi’s rigid policies and inability, maybe more unwillingness, to adapt.
In Hong Kong, the government is setting up a committee to name the two panda bears that will receive an elite police motorbike escort ‘in arrow formation’ on their arrival.