More from ‘external forces’

A group of lawyers’ organizations issue a statement on Chow Hang-tung…

Chow Hang-tung has been subjected to extensive harassment, multiple arrests, prolonged pre-trial detention and periods of solitary confinement by the authorities for her legitimate human rights work. In 2024, the government enacted further national security legislation under Article 23, ‘Safeguarding National Security Ordinance’. Chow Hang-tung was among the first to be targeted under this law, with new charges brought against her on 28 May 2024 for social media posts regarding a “sensitive date”, the Tiananmen Square anniversary that the authorities deemed as “inciting hatred” against Beijing. 

Following more than four years in pre-trial detention, often spent in prolonged solitary confinement, her trial commenced on 22 January 2026. Representing herself throughout the proceedings, she consistently sought to exercise her legal rights, including applying for bail, challenging restrictions on public reporting of the case, and contesting the secrecy that typically surrounds national security proceedings.

From HKFP – more on the government’s response to the negative publicity following the conviction of Lee Cheuk-yan and Chow Hang-tung…

…Echoing Friday’s judgment, the government statement said that the defendants “refused to pull back from the brink” even after Beijing implemented a national security law in Hong Kong, “and were bent on embracing the resistance line of the Alliance to the very end.” 

…a panel of government-appointed judges acknowledged that the activists did not suggest any specific means of ending one-party rule, and that the Alliance had never used or advocated violence.

But they said the defendants still spread the goal of “end one-party dictatorship” after the security law was passed, and compared the anti-extradition protests and unrest in 2019 to the “June 4th Incident” – the Tiananmen crackdown.

“[This stirred] up the hostility of [Hongkongers] towards the CCP, eroding and undermining the public’s confidence in its leadership,” they said. 

What brink did the defendants ‘refuse to pull back’ from? How do the authorities or courts detect or measure shifts in ‘public hostility to the CCP’? And if Lee and Chow did not suggest ways to end one-party rule or use/advocate violence, what exactly did they do – other than express an opinion? (So many other questions. For example: if one-party rule is beneficial to the people, why does the state feel a need to imprison citizens who call for an alternative?)

A mid-week read – American Affairs Journal on China’s domination of supply chains… 

For decades, companies and countries navigated this [politicized protectionism] environment with a rough working knowledge of the rules. Stay away from Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, and Tiananmen. Do not challenge China’s territorial claims. Do not embarrass the Party. Violate these norms and face the consequences, typically in the form of lost market access. It was an uncomfortable bargain, but a navigable one.

That changed in 2010. Following a territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, China did something it had never done before: it imposed an export ban on rare earth minerals, cutting off supplies to Japan. This was not market access coercion: China was not threatening to close its doors to Japanese goods. Instead, this was supply chain weaponization: China was threatening to cut off something Japan needed to make things, not just sell things. The distinction is fundamental. Market access coercion punishes you for what you export to China. Supply chain weaponization punishes you for what you need from China.

The world watched, took note, and moved on, concluding it was just Japan’s problem. That was a catastrophic misreading