The Bar Association politely hints at mild semi-discomfort over NPCSC ‘interpretation’ in the Jimmy Lai/Timothy Owens case. An SCMP article raises the possibility (apparently slim) that the NPCSC ruling might even lead to a special list of local lawyers permitted to handle NatSec cases. It also quotes Professor Johannes Chan Man-mun, former law dean at the University of Hong Kong, as saying…
…the seven-day adjournment was unfair to the defendant, as Lai would be unable to find an alternative lawyer in such a short time.
“No counsel would be able to take up such a big case within seven days, and further adjournments will be inevitable,” he said.
The official line that foreign lawyers somehow lack knowledge of NatSec doesn’t make much sense: that would be the client’s problem, not the government’s. Similarly, the claim that overseas counsel may be beholden to foreign powers is unconvincing: their priority is surely to protect the defendant’s interests. But no-one at press conferences or in op-eds seems to be asking why exactly the authorities are so desperate to keep Owen from defending Lai. Here are some interesting SCMP reader comments…
If the charges and evidence are robust, no matter who represents Lai, he should be convicted. The only possibly motivation is a fear of losing both the case and face … if indeed the charges and the law is robust and Lai is convicted despite being represented by a foreign lawyer, it will show the world that the law is clear, fair and justly applied. By denying him a choice of counsel, it actually weakens the credibility of NSL, the judiciary and the legislature.
And…
Any local lawyer who takes over this case would feel way more pressured than a foreign one.
Sesame Street is brought to you today by the phrase ‘三个坚定不移’, or ‘three unswervings’. (Maybe ‘three steadfasts’ would sound less silly. Or maybe not. Or ‘firmnesses’. All from Xinhua – translate as you see fit.) On the face of it, the three things are all about not deviating from protecting the people by fighting Covid. But they seem sufficiently overblown to suggest an underlying agenda of relaxing some extreme policies while maintaining that there’s no reversal going on.
Some more reading on the situation in the Mainland…
HKFP interviews a couple of Mainland students studying in Hong Kong on their thoughts about what’s happening back home.
AFP’s round-up of the weekend’s events.
Minxin Pei in Asia Nikkei…
The Chinese police can put protesters behind bars, but omicron will still be lurking. The economic and social toll of zero COVID will keep piling up and fuel future protests. The public image of Xi would take another hit, an inauspicious beginning for his unprecedented third term.
Leaders have to make tough choices. Ending zero COVID would be by far the lesser of two evils, however unattractive it may seem to Xi and the party.
Michael Schuman in Atlantic…
…after four decades of “reform and opening up,” as the Chinese call it, China’s citizens have become too connected to the world and too self-confident to be herded like obedient automatons by an unfettered state.
Hmmm.
From NPR…
…the emergence of the omicron variant a year ago caught the party flat-footed, and it’s had a hard time pivoting. A never-ending string of lockdowns and travel restrictions have hurt the economy and eroded public goodwill.
But dropping the policy and letting the pandemic spread would have its own high costs…
Chinese experts estimate if Beijing was to lift lockdowns immediately, the overwhelming number of hospitalizations would collapse its medical system.
A thread on the near impossibility of protesting in China without risk of individual identification by authorities.
And Jamil Anderlini on Chinese young people’s lack of awareness of earlier protest movements.
