Big Lychee, Various Sectors

NatSec police take family members of two more exiled activists – Simon Cheng and Frances Hui – in for questioning. Jimmy Lai’s London-based legal team ask the UN to investigate the alleged torture of key witness Andy Li…

“Credible evidence is emerging that Andy Li was tortured when in prison in China before confessing to allegedly conspiring with Jimmy Lai to collude with foreign entities to endanger national security,” the lawyers alleged.

Li’s confession against Lai was suspected to have been “coerced and obtained after he endured torture, inhuman and degrading treatment in Chinese detention,” they alleged.

In case you haven’t kept up – Jimmy Lai’s trial continues with details about donations to pro-dem political parties.

The Standard reports that Hong Kong’s dazzlingly original regulators might follow the SEC’s decision to approve spot crypto ETFs. The issuers accept only real money, of course. David Gerard on the US move…

The SEC really didn’t want to approve a spot bitcoin ETF. SEC Chair Gary Gensler issued a statement explaining that the SEC was pretty much forced to approve by the court decision in Grayscale. He stresses that this stuff is still shaky trash.

Unlike in the last two elections, HKU will not be sending students on a study tour to Taiwan this year.

Some more Taiwan reading…

Nikkei Asia reports that financial analysts don’t want to talk about Taiwan…

Ning Zhang, senior China economist at UBS Investment Research, said at a news conference in Hong Kong on Thursday that the topic of the election was “political,” and that it was “inconvenient” to comment on it.

BlackRock shied away from answering a question from Nikkei Asia on the impact of the Taiwan election on the fixed income market at a Singapore briefing on Tuesday. The fund manager skipped the online written query, with the company’s public relations representative later saying they had received too many questions.

“I feel very humble in my ability to predict politics,” Ben Powell, chief Asia-Pacific investment strategist at BlackRock Investment Institute, told reporters last month. “Even if you told me the answer, it is not totally clear what the implications for the markets” are.

A public relations representative with French bank Societe Generale, during a Tuesday briefing in Hong Kong, declined to answer a reporter’s question on the election’s impact on the Taiwan equities market, one of the top picks for the bank: “We’re not commenting on it right now.”

Thread from correspondent William Yang…

…an important point to highlight is that there is a huge gap between the level of interest in this election in #Taiwan versus around the world.

…when the #HongKong protest triggered a surge in this doomsday feeling among #Taiwan voters, [and their] attention and interest in the election was very high. It also resulted in a very high voter turnout.

This time around, the international community is paying a lot of attention to this election, mainly from the perspective of how the outcome of the election will have an impact on regional security and geopolitics.

However domestically, a lot of voters have told me that they are quite disinterested in the election, citing different reasons. Some said they can’t imagine themselves supporting any of the candidates while others feel very desensitized by all the campaign dramas and rhetoric.

So as all of us in the international media tries to fulfill our assumption and needs, please try to take some time to really understand the Taiwanese voters’ perspective on this election. Instead of shoveling questions related to cross-strait relations, China and the possibility of war into their faces, maybe try to give them an opportunity to plainly explain what matters the most to them in this election. It’s likely that you will get a very different set of priorities from them.

From the BBC (‘But a Bit Cliched’) – the Taiwan that China wants is vanishing…

“We are all Taiwanese today regardless of where our grandparents came from. We inter-marry and mix Taiwanese and Mandarin when we speak to each other,” say a group of hikers on a trail near Taipei.

When they travel abroad, they say they are from Taiwan. “We do not want people to think we are from China.”

That is a problem for Beijing – because they are deciding what they want to be.

And that runs counter to the CCP’s message – a unified China under the rule of the Communist Party. It’s a message that has been delivered to Tibetans, Uyghurs, Mongols – and Hong Kong.

Guardian video about Taiwanese civilians, inspired by the Ukrainian experience, organizing their own military training to defend urban areas from invaders.

Chatham House on Taiwan’s ‘China challenge’…

The successful consolidation of Taiwan’s democracy in recent decades has intensified the growth of a distinct Taiwanese identity. The more Taiwanese democracy and identity bed in, the harder it will be for Beijing to secure a peaceful integration of Taiwan, something that very few Taiwanese want.

As this uncomfortable reality has started to dawn on Beijing, it has ratcheted up its grey-zone tactics, using military intimidation and information operations to try to break Taiwan’s resolve, and diplomatic initiatives to isolate Taiwan internationally.

Other reading for the weekend…

Taiwanese people don’t want to be a part of China – nor do Chinese people. CNN on the rise in Chinese illegals into the US…

…In the first 11 months of 2023, more than 31,000 Chinese citizens were picked up by law enforcement crossing illegally into the US from Mexico, government data shows – compared with an average of roughly 1,500 per year over the preceding decade.

Many who left point to a struggle to survive.

Three years of Covid-19 lockdowns and restrictions left people across China out of work – and disillusioned with the ruling Communist Party’s increasingly tight grip on all aspects of life under Xi. Now, hope that business would fully rebound once restrictions ended a year ago has vanished, with China’s once envious economic growth stuttering.

Following the recent arrest of a Catholic bishop, the Pillar on the Vatican’s ‘Two Chinas’ problem…

The effective suppression of a diocese without Roman approval is a major departure from the norms of the Vatican’s current agreement with the Chinese government, though it is not the first time the Communist authorities have done so.

With the Vatican-China deal up for renewal this year, the Holy See’s Secretariat of State will have to decide if Beijing’s unilateral redrawing of the ecclesiastical map is a calculated provocation, and how it can respond within its limited diplomatic room to maneuver.

As such moves become more common, however, the Vatican will have to reckon with the emerging divide between the Church in China recognized by Rome, which increasingly exists only on paper, and a different reality on the ground, run by the [Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association]. 

China Media Project looks at the CCP’s mixed feelings about the word ‘dictator’…

The Party wants to have its cake and eat it too: to be all-powerful but also to be seen as representative; to be feared and to be loved — avowedly — throughout the world.

…In 2021, as authorities in Hong Kong used the Beijing-imposed national security law to jail nearly every prominent member of the political opposition, a microblogging account amplified by official media said pro-democracy protestors were the territory’s “real dictators” due to their appeals for sanctions on the authorities imprisoning them.

And something relaxing from Public Domain Review – a circa 1902 book of kimono fabric designs…

Three months in prison for a T-shirt – but feel free to block an ambulance with your Mercedes (registration clearly visible, plus lame CC tag). Of course, the T-shirt threatens the security of the nation, while emergency vehicles just drive around the streets making a silly noise.

Apparently, the NatSec judge went easy on Chu Kai-poon, whose T-shirt had the slogan ‘Liberate Hong Kong, revolution of our times’ on it…

The defendant, who is unemployed, has been remanded in custody since he first appeared in court on November 30 last year.

Designated national security judge Chief Magistrate Victor So said on Wednesday that the offence was less serious than in other sedition cases as it involved a small number of items and a relatively short period of time.

The judge said that between leaving his residence and arriving at the airport, Chu only publicly demonstrated the protest slogan for five hours and 23 minutes. This was less influential than posting it on the internet, So said. He added that Chu had no political affiliation.

Found here, a table ranking 214 territories by birth rate (I’ve edited the version on the right). You would have thought that, with a drop in the number of children, Hong Kong would need fewer teachers. But an RTHK report suggests there’s a shortage of them too…

More than 6,700 Hong Kong teachers quit their jobs during the last academic year which was a 25 percent increase on the year before, government figures given to Legco revealed on Wednesday.

Secondary schools saw about nine percent of teachers resign, while for primary schools the rate was 10 percent. Kindergartens lost 17 percent of their teachers.

Data also showed that the number of new recruits failed to fill many of the gaps the departing teachers left in the city’s schools and kindergartens, with more than 1,100 posts remaining vacant.

But speaking to reporters, Education Secretary Christine Choi described the supply of teachers in Hong Kong as “very abundant”.

Almost as if there’s a competition between kids and teachers to see who can disappear first.

Taiwan votes on Saturday. HKFP have a team covering the election. (Evidence here of how clean the campaign is.)

Why is it important? Stock answer from Bloomberg…

War over Taiwan would have a cost in blood and treasure so vast that even those unhappiest with the status quo have reason not to risk it. Bloomberg Economics estimate the price tag at around $10 trillion, equal to about 10% of global GDP — dwarfing the blow from the war in Ukraine, Covid pandemic and Global Financial Crisis.

…Taiwan makes most of the world’s advanced logic semiconductors, and a lot of lagging edge chips as well. Globally, 5.6% of total value added comes from sectors using chips as direct inputs — nearly $6 trillion.

Taiwan is also Asia’s most vibrant democracy. To give an idea of the complexity of the island’s history: did you know that the first Fujianese settlers started arriving after parts of the aboriginal population were more-or-less pacified by… the Dutch? After a brief period as a province of the Manchu Qing dynasty, the Japanese took it over and did the usual railways/schools/exploitation colonial thing. The post WWII KMT were, if anything, harsher rulers, but eventually allowed free elections in the 1980s. 

The DPP likes to say there is no need to declare independence because the country is already independent. That was a psychological as much as constitutional shift – a realization that, after democratization, the ROC was an empty shell with something different living in it. Today, even descendants of the KMT-era Mainland immigrants are discovering and developing a specifically Taiwanese consciousness. China would ideally like the KMT to win, but Beijing’s canny hearts-and-minds team can always be relied upon to give the DPP and Taiwanese identity a boost (cue spy balloons,missile tests, PLA bomber incursions and NatSec trials in Hong Kong). In the Covid-Ukraine era, Taiwan has also enjoyed a growing profile in the West.

Let’s say it’s more interesting than Hong Kong elections these days.

A Guardian editorial applauds Taiwan’s democracy…

For many voters, their biggest gripes with the DPP are low wages, high housing costs and poor public services. Mr Lai’s good fortune is that they don’t think much of the alternatives. The KMT’s Hou Yu-ih and third candidate Ko Wen-je of the Taiwan People’s party tried to cut a deal but ended up in a humiliating public spat instead. Mr Ko, who initially attracted people disenchanted with the DPP but unwilling to back the KMT, has proved erratic and unimpressive.

Whatever the outcome, Taiwan’s election should be applauded. As authoritarianism advances across much of Asia, its vigorous debate and free and fair elections are a beacon for a better way of doing things.

Beijing has made it clear that it would dish out punishment for a third DPP term … a political pathway to unification looks still more remote since the crackdown in Hong Kong.

A WSJ editorial…

The common theme is the desire of Taiwan’s voters to preserve their democracy even as they debate how. They understand the stakes after witnessing Hong Kong’s fate. Beijing has proven with its crackdown on freedom in that territory that “one country, two systems” really means the end of democracy. The Communist Party will always impose its own system.

If Mr. Lai wins as expected, Beijing is likely to go into blustering overdrive as it always does when Taiwan voters refuse to cooperate with the Party’s will. Commentators may present such a vote as a provocation…

The affront to the Party isn’t Mr. Lai’s policies, and Taiwan’s voters won’t have stoked tensions with Beijing by electing him. The problem is that Beijing can’t tolerate Taiwan’s example of a thriving Chinese-speaking democracy in which voters settle political differences at the ballot box. If a conflict breaks out in the Taiwan Strait, this will be why. And Taiwan’s voters know it as they head to the polls.

From several weeks ago, a New Statesman correspondent (and former Portuguese minister) looks around as campaigning gets underway…

Slowly but inexorably, the US has modified its position on Taiwan. It once committed not to challenge the concept that Taiwan is part of China, but that was before China became a peer rival, one aiming to replace American global hegemony. Today, even a peaceful reunification with the mainland has begun to seem intolerable to Washington. What makes the present moment so dangerous is that the US is not the only actor to feel uncomfortable with the fragile understanding agreed between Mao and Nixon half a century ago.

The Taiwanese officials I spoke to during my visit believe that Xi Jinping has unilaterally modified the status quo over Taiwan. As made clear in Xi’s speech on Taiwan in January 2019, China now affirms that the status quo is in fact a status quo of irrevocable movement towards reunification…

…I am told that in the meeting between Xi Jinping and Joe Biden in Bali in November 2022, the Chinese president said that China reserved the right to use force if the Taiwanese did not make a genuine effort to bring about China’s reunification. This was an entirely new position and, in the words of someone with direct knowledge of the Bali meeting, “it freaked the American delegation out”.

The BBC on the KMT’s difficult balancing act…

Another risk is that it is not clear whether a KMT government would necessarily be able to appease Beijing and guarantee peace.

“The KMT believes that it can get Beijing to promise restraint and stick to it. Looking at China’s position on Hong Kong, I’m less sure about Beijing’s willingness to commit to anything,” said Ian Chong, a non-resident scholar at Carnegie China.

“If KMT wins, maybe temporarily Beijing will ease off. But ultimately they want control of Taiwan, either through economic dependence, or show of force and intimidation.”

This also represents a problem for the KMT in the long term. With each generation, the gulf widens between what voters want for Taiwan’s relationship with China, and what the KMT has stood for.

New Bloom on Beijing’s Taiwan narrative…

…Taiwan has lived under Beijing’s constant military threat of “reunification.” However, Taiwan is often portrayed by Chinese propagandists as a “troublemaker” capable of destabilising the Indo-Pacific region or making China “upset about everything we [Taiwan] do, about our existence,” as Taiwan’s ex-ambassador to the United States Hsiao Bi-khim noted. Taiwan’s independence, be it a political appeal or an objective reality, is provocative to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The CCP’s mouthpieces have effectively convinced numerous international observers to discourage Taiwan’s quest for independence and characterized Taiwan’s autonomy as an affront to the Chinese people.

CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping and his predecessors have consistently stressed the importance of the “Taiwan question” to the Chinese nation and the necessity of unification. In a recent interview, former Chinese ambassador to the U.S., Cui Tiankai, described the Taiwan question as a “life-or-death question for China” with ”no room for concession.” Chinese officials and commentators often invoke the “will of 1.4 billion Chinese people” when discussing the criticality of the CCP’s historic mission to integrate Taiwan.

New Bloom on the extent of Hong Kong’s influence on Taiwan’s election…

…Taiwan always sees Hong Kong as a “counter-factual” of unification with China. Since its handover in 1997, Hong Kong has been the PRC’s showroom of the “one country, two systems (1C2S)” model as a possible Cross-Strait unification arrangement for Taiwan. A democratic and autonomous Hong Kong under 1C2S would give Taiwan a prospect that Taiwan can also remain democratic and autonomous under the PRC’s unification arrangement … The 2019 protest … raised Taiwan’s dire concerns over Hong Kong’s autonomy and sent out a strong signal that questioned KMT’s compromising attitude towards China. It finally crashed the craze of Han Kuo-yu and saved the DPP from its ebb in the 2020 general election.

But in the coming days, Hong Kong is not much of a focus.

AP talks to Hongkongers’ about their involvement…

As Taiwan’s presidential election approaches, many immigrants from Hong Kong, witnesses to the alarming erosion of civil liberties at home, are supporting the ruling Democratic Progressive Party.

An article on Chinese identity – and KMT links – among Taiwanese gangsters, from Shanghai’s Green Gang to the Bamboo Union, with reference to a Netflix series I haven’t seen…

We can … see how the Chinese Nationalists might have self-justified violence against native Taiwanese — and how the need to counter threats such as these may have given rise to, or sustained the need for, native Taiwanese gangs as well. 

On Taiwan culture: Clarissa Wei (author of the Made in Taiwan food book) on Japanese culinary influence – as seen in bento boxes on sale at Taipei Main Station.

The government’s decision to tighten access to vehicle registration records meets with criticism from a slightly unexpected source: a member of the all-patriots legislature.

Today’s lawmakers are a bit of a haze – a few pro-Beijing stalwarts plus a bunch of people you’ve never heard of. Mostly pretty silent. So – behold Doreen Kong. A lawyer with positions on an odd mish-mash of issues such as domestic helpers making food on the street (anti), building temporary housing (anti), and higher betting taxes (anti). She does seem to be pro-leather jackets.

The SCMP reporter describes the official response…

Journalists will need permission from Hong Kong’s transport commissioner to access the personal information of vehicle owners,  while applications might be rejected on national security grounds or due to a lack of public interest.

Vested Interests of the Week Awards:

The boss of Centaline real estate agency wants MPF funds and investor-visa applicants’ cash diverted into the property market ‘to help maintain Hong Kong as a financial centre’.

And the Liberal Party – home to big commercial landlords – suggests a departure tax on permanent residents, so they stop going to Shenzhen and spending money there – or ‘boost government revenues’.

Remember when RTHK’s Bao Choy was cleared on appeal after being prosecuted for accessing the vehicle registration system? The government has now responded – by making access to the system much harder. Standard editorial…

[The government’s measure] could also go against the spirit of the top court’s judgment, as commonly understood, when it could have been fairly simple for the authority to conform with the spirit without complicating the matter to such an extent.

Did the CFA not already state in paragraph 62 that “whilst such rights are not absolute and may be restricted where necessary, there is no reason to proceed from a starting point that bona fide journalism should be excluded from the phrase ‘[o]ther traffic and transport related matters'”?

[Transport Commissioner Angela] Lee could have readily aligned with the CFA ruling by simply inserting a footnote to the original form to include “bona fide journalism” as a valid reason under “other traffic and transport-related matters” in accordance with the CFA’s view.

…Worse still, the hurdles being put up by the transport department set a poor example for company, land and other searches crucial to journalistic duties.

Not to mention the duties of lawyers and investment analysts.

HKFP op-ed on the apparent decline in the right to have a lawyer present when talking with police, with reference to Agnes Chow and Tony Chung…

There is nothing in the national security law’s Article 43, which deals with police powers, to suggest that any new right is being conferred to deprive defendants and others involved in legal proceedings of their right to counsel.

…People involved in involuntary interactions with the police are entitled to have a lawyer present. Requiring them not only to engage in such interactions without counsel, but also not to consult a lawyer afterwards, is oppressive…

And another Jimmy Lai trial graphic, raising the question: is the trial about actions or opinions?

The prosecution presents more of its case in the Jimmy Lai trial…

Hong Kong media mogul Jimmy Lai was the “mastermind and sponsor” of a campaign to lobby for foreign sanctions on the city and on China, a government prosecutor argued in the pro-democracy activist’s high-profile national security trial.

…The prosecutor described the chain of command in the syndicate. Lai personally instructed Mark Simon, his US-based personal assistant. Simon, in turn, gave directions to Chan, who instructed Li and Finn Lau, the core members of an international lobbying group called Stand With Hong Kong (SWHK), he said.

And from RTHK…

The trial of former media tycoon Jimmy Lai was told on Thursday that the defendant was the mastermind and a key financial supporter of an international campaign aimed at bringing down the Chinese government.

…The prosecution alleged that Lai later outlined a four-stage “implosion” agenda to instigate “administrative and economic turmoil in China”.

Samuel Bickett adds…

In Jimmy Lai’s trial today, the prosecutor focused on ads Lai allegedly funded calling for the world to support Hong Kong’s protests. They were published in Aug 2019, almost a year before Beijing imposed the NatSec Law under which Jimmy is now charged.

It is a fundamental principle that laws only apply to future acts, not past ones. For Jimmy, the court is simply choosing to ignore that principle. 

Beijing said in the lead up to the NSL’s passage that the law would not be applied retroactively.

From here – Heroic Graphic-Design Effort of the Week Award goes to a map-pictogram/flow-chart thing showing Jimmy Lai’s plot to do whatever etc, according to the prosecution…

(And I’ve cropped it.)

Meanwhile…

The Liberal Party’s Jeremy Young said a large sign, such as “I LOVE HK”, would show the world that the SAR has returned to normalcy.

New all-patriots District Council members hit the ground running, with a selection of banal ideas to boost tourism…

Cat murals, a time tunnel and Lantern Festival markets are among initiatives proposed by Hong Kong’s 18 district councils to show how unique each area is and lure in more visitors.

Central and Western District Council, which held the first meeting of its new term on Thursday, wants to set up a huge landmark at Peak Road Garden and a “time tunnel” at the facade of the Old Mental Hospital in Sai Ying Pun.

(OK – so ‘time tunnel at old mental hospital’ at least sounds interesting. Sort of captures some contemporary Hong Kong spirit.)

A district councillor said on Thursday he believed putting neon signs at street level around Tsim Sha Tsui could boost economic activities in the area, as the installations could provide photo opportunities for tourists and residents.

Problem: the government has been removing neon signs for years.

And more on District Office’s contributions…

The Kowloon City District Office proposed only one event, which is the annual Thai Songkran festival in April.

But instead of calling it the “water-splashing festival,” the Kowloon City District Office proposed what roughly translates to “Thai Vibes Kowloon City with food and water-splashing” — apparently adapted from the government’s earlier “Night Vibes Hong Kong.”

Problem: the Hong Kong police are not big fans of Songkran. (And shouldn’t that be ‘Thai Thematic Water Vibes Concept-cum-Food Zone Scheme’?)

Some weekend reading…

Beijing’s policies are – to no-one’s surprise – making life harder for those trashy franchised international schools…

A new “patriotic” education law is set to put a squeeze on British schools in China as Beijing steps up its efforts to tighten control of what is taught in its classrooms.

Harrow Beijing did not respond to a request for comment. The school was previously known as Harrow International Beijing, but on 1 September 2021, a new private education law came into effect, banning private schools that accepted Chinese nationals from including the name of overseas educational institutions in their name, or words such as “international” or “world”.

From Newsweek – a reminder of China’s extreme inequality. Maybe 10-20% of the population have a middle-class lifestyle surrounded by skyscrapers, high-speed trains and overseas vacations. Don’t mention the rest…

Internet censors in China worked around the clock this week to suppress online discussions about poverty in the country after an economist revealed nearly 1 billion people were living off less than $300 a month.

…In his article for the business outlet Yicai, Li cited data from a 2021 research paper by the China Institute of Income Distribution at Beijing Normal University, which placed the number of people living on less than 2,000 yuan a month at 964 million, or nearly 70 percent of the population.

…In June 2020, Wang Haiyuan and Meng Fanqiang, the authors behind the income study cited by Li this week, published an article in China’s leading financial news magazine Caixin, in which they quoted late Premier Li Keqiang’s comments about the estimated 600 million Chinese people who were living on less than 1,000 yuan, or $140, a month.

“Although 40 years of reform and opening up have greatly improved the country’s comprehensive strength and level of national income, as of today, the fact that we have a large population, few resources and very uneven development is still obvious, and a considerable number of residents are still close to the poverty line,” Wang and Meng wrote.

The government unveils a ‘Characteristic Local Tourism Incentive Scheme’. The initiative expands on a 2020 package intended to ‘incentivize the travel trade to develop more tourism products and itineraries with cultural and heritage elements’.

It is ‘characteristic’ in that it is obviously devised by bureaucrats and relies on handouts to the industry, with the taxpayer paying tour companies to take visitors (or locals) to a prescribed list of attractions, which of course come in two clunkily-named categories…

The CTIS is divided into two parts, namely the in-depth travel and thematic travel … The  [former] itinerary must cover at least two designated sites of in-depth travel and one interactive tourist experience activity with Hong Kong’s unique and authentic experience recognised under the CTIS … [For the latter, the travel agent] has to focus on six distinctive themes, including national history, green ecology, marine, traditional culture, pop culture, and creative travel in designing the itinerary and provide visitors with a captivating and in-depth travel experience in Hong Kong. Details of the application will be announced in mid-January, along with the promulgation of the six winning thematic itineraries under the Deeper into Hong Kong: Creative Itinerary Design Competition.

Officials hope that this scheme will meet with the same ‘enthusiastic response’ as the 2020 one – and why wouldn’t it when operators get HK$200-400 per pax? 

Why does the government need to subsidize such tours? Could it be that tourists would prefer to be doing something other (or cheaper) than being dragged to an intangible green ecology site? 

A memorable moment during the Swire ‘Under the Stars’ open-air picnic/concert at Central waterfront a couple of months ago: a tourist ‘Big Bus’ drove past on its route of government-promoted attractions, and the passengers on the open top deck looked on (enviously, I was pretty sure) at local people enjoying some genuine (private-sector-organized) night vibes.

Meanwhile, the NatSec-focused part of the government sends a different message to would-be visitors.

A Japanese tourist gets shouted at by a Hong Kong cop – plus receives the finger-pointing treatment. How many people in Japan have now seen the video?

And then there’s the Jimmy Lai trial. The latest from HKFP…

Hong Kong media mogul Jimmy Lai used his pro-democracy tabloid Apple Daily, which ceased operations in 2021, as a platform to “sway public opinion” and “promote hatred” against Beijing and Hong Kong authorities, a court has heard as the closely-watched national security trial entered its fifth day.

…[Lead prosecutor Anthony] Chau said that Lai had followed 53 Twitter accounts, including then US vice-president Mike Pence, Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen, and UK-based activists Luke de Pulford and Benedict Rogers.

Alex Lee, one of three designated national security judges presiding over the trial, challenged Chau on the purpose of showing the list of Twitter accounts Lai had followed.

“He’s interested in international affairs, so?” Lee said.

Caoilfhionn Gallagher KC comments…

…2 ridiculous examples of ‘conspiracy to commit journalism’ charges today.

1. Allegation Jimmy Lai sought a comment on the extradition bill from former HK Governor Chris Patten.

This is simply public interest journalism…

The Prosecution produced, as ‘evidence’ of his ‘crime,’ a message sent to @benedictrogers in order to reach Chris Patten.

Simply ludicrous. It impacts any journalist seeking a comment on an issue of public importance, via a contact who is a UK (or other foreign) national. 

2. “Apple Daily continued to publish inflammatory publications in an attempt to sway public opinion…Relevant articles are directed at the central government, Hong Kong govt & the entire regime.”

Now it’s a ‘crime’ to publish opinionated journalism & criticise the Government. 

More daily trial updates, including translations from The Witness and Ming Pao, here.

Jimmy Lai pleads not guilty to collusion with foreign forces and publishing ‘seditious’ materials. In a move guaranteed to provoke anger – or at least derision – overseas…

The prosecution … displayed a chart labelled “Lai Chee-ying’s external political connections,” showing headshots of overseas figures that Lai was said to be in communication with. Among them were Benedict Rogers and Luke de Pulford, both UK-based human rights activists, as well as James Cunningham, the former consul general in Hong Kong. 

Jack Keane, a former US army general and Paul Wolfowitz, a former US deputy secretary of defence, were also named. 

More from the Committee for Freedom in HK on overseas co-conspirators… 

On the fourth day of the trial, the court was also given a list of people named as “co-conspirators” on trumped up charges of “collusion with foreign forces” with Jimmy Lai and named several foreign citizens – including James Cunningham, former U.S. Consul General in Hong Kong, and Chairman of the Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong Foundation, Luke de Pulford, Executive Director of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC), Bill Browder, founder of the Global Magnitsky Justice Campaign, Benedict Rogers, founder of Hong Kong Watch and former Japanese MP Shiori Kanno.

From HK Watch (VPN or similar needed in Hong Kong)…

“The naming of Benedict Rogers and several other international campaigners for democracy in Hong Kong in the trial of Jimmy Lai shows this charade of a trial has nothing to do with justice. It is simply an assertion of CCP authoritarianism. It makes a mockery of the rule of law. 

…“This simply shows [Rogers says], as we have said all along, that this is a show trial and has absolutely nothing to do with genuine national security. The ‘crime’ Mr Lai is accused of is talking with foreign politicians and activists, including myself, and engaging in journalism – which, as the publisher of a major newspaper in Hong Kong, ought to be regarded as entirely normal legitimate activity. 

“Furthermore, much of this activity pre-dates the National Security Law, which means the law is being applied retroactively – something the Hong Kong government gave assurances would not happen when it was imposed on 1 July 2020…”

Safeguard Defenders.calls the process ‘an unacceptable infringement of national sovereignty ‘ and demands that overseas jurisdictions scrap extradition and mutual police assistance agreements with Hong Kong. 

(The Standard notes that Lai, along with legal assistant Chan Tsz-wah and private assistant Mark Simon, are accused of ‘calling on US, New Zealand, UK, Japan, Czech and Ireland to suspend extradition agreements with Hong Kong’ as part of the alleged collusion with external forces.)

Bill Browder says…

Hong Kong authorities have named me as a “co-conspirator” in the trial against Jimmy Lai. Although I’ve never met or spoken to him, they’re accusing him of being a part of my global campaign for Magnitsky sanctions against human rights violators.

Also from Benedict Rogers…

People who simply campaigned for democracy deemed “co-conspirators” with #JimmyLai 

People who simply spoke with him are “collaborators”

Who next? Everyone who bought Apple Daily?

Video by Luke de Pulford on being named as a co-conspirator along with Jimmy Lai: ‘The idea that 2 million people took to the streets because Jimmy told them to is risible’. 

A Bloomberg op-ed…

Lai has spent more than 1,000 days in pre-trial detention, and has been denied his choice of legal representation. Instead of a jury, his fate will be determined by a selection of judges handpicked by Hong Kong Chief Executive John Lee. The courts have, so far, a 100% conviction rate for anyone charged under the law.

…A devout Christian, Lai has said in the past that he was willing to “pay the price” for his beliefs, to save the city that brought him his fame and fortune. Tragically, though, Hong Kong is no longer the place Lai once lauded for its freedom and called heaven. His trial will serve as a reminder of just how far Beijing will go to crush any opposition to its rule, in what was once one of Asia’s most storied cities.

…there will be no relief from NatSec. The trials of Jimmy Lai and the HK47 will make international headlines, and no doubt there will be more arrests for T-shirts and Facebook posts, more patriotism in schools, and more bounties for exiled dissidents. Then there’s the local (Article 23) NatSec Law – abandoned in 2003, but still needed to ‘plug gaps’. As the HKFP explainer says…

…the city’s own security law should prohibit seven types of offences – treason; secession; sedition; subversion against the central government; theft of state secrets; foreign bodies’ conducting political activities in the city; and local bodies establishing ties with foreign bodies.

What will be in it?

Obviously new legislation on treason, secession, theft of state secrets, etc – presumably with looser wording, tougher penalties and weaker protection for suspects than found in existing statutes. 

Almost certainly a replacement for the colonial-era (1920s) sedition law. Although barely used in colonial times, the old law was resurrected after 2019, and charges for various forms of ‘incitement’ are now commonplace, such as for the aforementioned T-shirts, Facebook posts, etc. But the colonial legislation has a maximum prison sentence of just two years, so we can expect harsher penalties, in line with other NatSec offenses.

Almost certainly measures aimed at media, academic, cultural and other groups and individuals with links to ‘foreign bodies’ that somehow threaten national security. Targets could be affiliates of international organizations that are critical of Hong Kong or China, or correspondents and academics suspected as spies or insurrection-plotters.

Probably new powers that in effect tighten control of the press, eg giving enforcement agencies greater powers to investigate suspected secessionist or subversive materials. 

Probably provisions attempting to do something similar with the Internet.

Maybe some sort of measures to counter other ‘soft resistance’ – activities or expressions the authorities wish they could treat as illegal but currently can’t. No-one seems to be able to produce a specific definition; perhaps the best way of looking at it is that if sedition laws aim to limit particular opinions, ‘soft resistance’ targets attitude. Maybe a ‘picking quarrels’ type of offense? Or somehow penalizing lack of sincerity or enthusiasm in expressing loyalty or patriotism? There has been behind-the-scenes controversy over this, but no signs that the authorities will listen to warnings of NatSec ‘overkill’.

Twenty years ago during the first attempt to implement Article 23, there was a serious public consultation exercise – of which many of us have fond or other memories. It is hard to believe that the authorities will be at all flexible with the 2024 edition.

Indeed, transparency of any sort doesn’t seem to be much of a priority. From Transit Jam on Sunday…

An index of 106 Hong Kong National Security Law (NSL) and sedition judgements has disappeared from a new Department of Justice (DOJ) webpage just days after its publication, with no explanation forthcoming from DOJ.

Originally launched on Thursday, DOJ’s “Annotations” webpage featured a useful and comprehensive index of all NSL- and sedition-related judgements under the NSL regime … in English only – aimed at improving transparency and international understanding of Hong Kong’s national security environment and serving as, according to DOJ, a “convenient and practical tool for promoting national security education and conducting legal research”. At its launch Thursday, Secretary for Justice, Paul Lam said “This body of case-law helps us understand the requirements of our national security laws and how they are being applied by the courts.”

…The index deletion in Hong Kong could signify tension between Hong Kong’s desire to give the international community transparency on NSL and the central government’s handling of “negative social phenomena”, a battle between face and facts. 

Transit Jam’s copy of the site.

Maybe at some point, reputational and overall economic harm will cause policymakers in high places to consider reining in the whole NatSec thing. But not in 2024.

The Hong Kong government says the city’s freedoms are better protected now we have the NatSec Law. HKFP reports…

In a three-page report to the UN Human Rights Council published on Saturday, authorities said Hong Kong had taken a “major turn from chaos to governance” after the security legislation and measures ensuring only “patriots” can run in elections were implemented.

“Hong Kong society has put the volatile situation behind it, and the rights and freedoms of Hong Kong residents are better protected in a safer and more orderly environment,” the report read.

Dozens of civil society groups have shut down since [the NatSec Law’s introduction], while independent media outlets have also closed following police raids and the arrests of top executives.

A thread from Renaud Haccart…

Some factual changes in HK in the past 4 years: fewer functioning political parties, elections with less diverse candidates, public demonstration where [organizers] get “invited for tea” by the police and in several cases suddenly withdraw their applications, less diverse media.

We can also add elections where less of the outcome depends on HK people’s opinions, leading to a legislative branch that’s less able to reflect the diverse opinions of HKers, and an executive that now controls candidacy at elections. Some public records are harder to consult.

It’s hard to find a single law, governmental measure or change in attitude from the authorities that have gone in the direction of more freedom in the past 4 years. Quite the opposite.

A few between-long-weekends things…

HKFP on activists trying to get the government to stop paving over rural paths…

“Because [the government] does not have any conservation standards to follow, the default option is, of course, to use concrete.”

Could we say this campaign is pro-‘soft resistance’?

From the Carter Center’s US-China Perception Monitor, a translation of an article by Mainland political scientist Hu Wei reflecting on Deng Xiaoping’s thoughts on reform and opening up. While paying due deference to the current official lines and slogans, he implicitly criticizes the current leadership’s direction…

Whether moving towards  modernization, the world, and the future, or regressing to tradition, self-seclusion, and absolutism, is the litmus test for judging whether to continue reform and opening up. Among them, how to handle relations with the West, especially the United States, is a key prerequisite for the success of China’s modernization. Many people always believe that the U.S. seeks to destroy China, which does not conform to the historical facts of reform and opening up and contradicts Deng’s initial judgment about war and peace. Even if the U.S. harbors such intentions, they should be resolved rather than intensified. If we oppose everything the U.S. supports and support everything against the U.S., Sino-US relations will definitely not improve. The deterioration of current Sino-US relations deserves deep reflection, and how to escape the “Thucydides Trap” requires greater wisdom.

The Diplomat on the rise of extreme Han ethno-nationalism in China…

…non-Han dynasties, particularly the Mongol-led Yuan and Manchu-led Qing, complicate China’s ethno-national identity. The Qing era (1644-1911), often viewed by Han nationalists as colonial rule, is especially contentious within the Imperial Han faction, which rejects its contribution to the Han legacy.

…This movement is more than nostalgia. It represents a complex mix of pride, identity, and ambition for global recognition … this movement now significantly influences Beijing’s narratives and policies. 

A group the author calls ‘Radicals’ are the ‘most assertive’. Then you have the more wishy-washy types, like…

The Conservative Faction: More restrained in territorial claims, conservatives base their aspirations on ancient Chinese literature and records. They advocate for a China that mirrors territorial descriptions from these texts, encompassing an ambitiously large area from Lake Baikal in Siberia to the Rocky Mountains in North America. 

Their approach also includes aggressive strategies against perceived historical violators of the Han people, with extreme suggestions like using nuclear force as retaliation for past aggressions, specifically against Japan for its actions in World War II.

Well, quite.

A video of Taiwan Foreign Minister Joseph Wu opening presents from Santa. They are items from around the world that China has barred from importing for political reasons.